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CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC
FINANCE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata*
First, I would like to congratulate the Washington College of Law
and the Human Rights Law Institute for convening this conference and
thank them particularly for inviting me to be with you today. I intend
briefly to address the theme of this conference from a personal perspec-
tive, taking into account the most recent thinking at the World Bank.,
There is no doubt in my mind that development, in the broad sense
of human progress, must encompass the culmination of a broad array
of basic rights. These rights include not only economic, social and cul-
tural rights, but basic political rights as well. Therefore, discussion of
"development" and "human rights" as two distinct matters may appear
misleading.
This broad concept of development is reflected in both United Na-
tions (U.N.) resolutions and declarations on the issue, including the
1968 Proclamation of Tehran at the 27th meeting of the U.N. Interna-
tional Conference on Human Rights,2 and the 1986 U.N. General As-
sembly Declaration on the Right to Development.3 This notion of devel-
opment is also articulated in the latest World Development Report,
which was published by the World Bank in 1991."
* Vice President and General Counsel, The World Bank.
1. A more detailed account can be found in IBRAHIh F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991). Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 dcal respectively with
governance, human rights, involuntary resettlement and the environment.
2. Proclamation of Tehran, adopted at the International Conference on Human
Rights, Tehran, Iran, 13 May 1968.
3. G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1987).
4. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1991). This report is a basic World
Bank document.
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According to this staff document, which not only received the en-
dorsement of the World Bank's management, but was also discussed in
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors, the essence of development
encompasses not only higher incomes but also better education, higher
standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment,
more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer
cultural life.5 As Jan Pronk, the Dutch Minister of Development Coop-
eration, advocates, development is not simply an economic concern, and
does not just mean growth in the sense of more of the same. Using a
more comprehensive definition of development, a guarantee of human
rights protection does not merely relate to development but is central to
the development process.'
For any international financial institution, such as the World Bank,
the question becomes, not whether human rights are relevant to devel-
opment, but whether the mandate of such an institution, as defined and
limited by its Articles of Agreement, 7 can cover the promotion and pro-
tection of all human rights, or is limited to the rights which have an
economic or social character as opposed to a political character. This
latter question is obviously a technical one which raises an important
institutional issue as a matter of interpretation of the constituent agree-
ment of the World Bank. This discussion is neither a philosophical is-
sue about the meaning of development in the abstract, in which little
disagreement is found, nor an ethical issue about the importance of
political rights in human development, where little disagreement is also
found.
The pressing issue should be further distinguished from the policy
question of whether the charters of international financial institutions
should be amended to enable them to serve all the purposes of develop-
ment. In other words, the question which must be asked is whether
these institutions should be required to move beyond addressing free-
dom from poverty, into the realm of addressing all types of freedoms.
From the World Bank's perspective, reference to the Articles of Agree-
ment, should be made in addressing this question. The same applies to
the Bank's affiliated institution, the International Development Associ-
5. WORLD BANK, 1991 WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1991).
6. John Pronk is currently the Minister of Development Cooperation in the Nether-
lands. See Tjitske Lingsma, Netherlands: "Colonialsit" Tag Touches Tender Dutch
Nerve, INTER PRESS SERV., Apr. 4, 1992 (referring to Minister Pronk's belief that de-
velopment in Indonesia should be linked to human rights).
7. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT art. I (1989).
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ation (IDA).' The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the parent institution,
clearly describe the institution as a financial agency. The IBRD pro-
vides loans as well as loan guarantees primarily to finance specific
projects, geared for particular purposes and performed through specific
means, in member countries.' The IBRD's purposes and means are
stated as including: (1) assistance in the reconstruction and develop-
ment of member territories by facilitating the investment of capital for
productive purposes; (2) promotion of private foreign investment by
guarantees and participation in loans, and supplementing such invest-
ments by direct loans; and (3) promotion of the growth of international
trade, and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments, by
encouraging international investment.10 The goal of these loans (and
guarantees) is to assist in raising productivity, the standards of living,
and conditions of labor. Further, their rationale matches the purposes
of the IBRD as stated in its first Article."' The International Develop-
ment Association's Articles of Agreement entrust it with the mandate
to, "promote economic development, increase productivity, and thus
raise standards of living in the less developed areas of the world in-
cluded within the Association's membership, in particular by providing
financing to meet their important developmental requirements."' 2
Plainly, these provisions do not envisage a role for either institution
in the political reform of their borrowing members. By expanding the
scope and types of lending in order to adapt to the changing needs of
its borrowing members, the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) has continu-
ously developed its functions beyond the narrow limits of the literal
8. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT sched.
A (1960). This association is funded through periodic replenishment of its resources by
the more financially able among its members.
9. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT art. I (1989).
10. Id. The IBRD has two additional purposes: (1) the coordination of loans and
guarantees by the IBRD with other sources of international financial assistance to com-
plete the most urgent projects first; and (2) the raising of sensitivity to the effect of
international investment on business conditions in post-war economies to bring about a
smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. art. I, §§ i, ii (establishing that some of the purposes for creating the
IBRD included the promotion of reconstruction and development and the encourage-
ment of private foreign investment). If private investment is not possible, then the
IBRD must provide financial assistance for productive purposes either out of its own
capital, from funds raised by the IBRD, or from other resources. Id. art. IV, § I (a)(i)-
(iii).
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meaning of the provisions of their Articles of Agreement. 13 These func-
tions, as now envisioned by the institution and its members, have been
interpreted broadly with the concurrence of the Board of Executive Di-
rectors. 4 As a result, the World Bank is generally viewed by its mem-
bers as an agency for economic development par excellence. The
Bank's operations have reached numerous diverse issues including pop-
ulation, education, health, and social security, 15 even though none of
these issues are specifically mentioned in the Articles of Agreement.'0
By broadly interpreting the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, the
Bank is better able to serve the changing needs of its members. In my
view, this model shows a legally sound approach which I have person-
ally supported since I joined the World Bank as its General Counsel in
1983. Difficulty arises when the application of this broad interpretation
threatens to violate explicit prohibitions in these Articles, or conflict
with the Bank's purpose as stated in its Articles of Agreement. The
Articles of Agreement state explicit provisions which prohibit political
activity. Included amongst these provisions are the notions that:
[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any mem-
ber; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of
the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be rele-
vant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in
order to achieve the purposes stated in Article 1.I7
13. See SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 25-34 (stating that structural adjustment loans
and sectoral adjustment loans, introduced in the 1980's, expanded the scope of the
Articles of Agreement). These new loans were designed to restructure the economy of a
country as a precondition for the sound financing of new investment. Id.
14. See DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS UNDER ARTICLE IX OF THE AR-
TICLES OF AGREEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT 6-7 (1991) (finding that the Articles of Agreement allow the Bank to
make or guarantee loans for programs of economic reconstruction, and the reconstruc-
tion of monetary systems, including long-term stabilization loans). The Executive Di-
rectors included guaranteed loans, other than for purposes of specific projects, provided
that such loans fell within the general purposes of the Bank. INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. I (1989);
see also id. art. IX; INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT art. X (1991) (stating that the Bank's Executive Directors have the au-
thority to interpret the Articles, however, any member has the power to request that a
decision go before the Board of Governors for review).
15. See SHIHATA, supra note I, at 116-20 (finding that the Bank spent one billion
dollars on basic education in developing countries in fiscal year 1990 and was preparing
to increase funding to one and one-half billion dollars annually over the next three
years; and the Bank lent $340 million between 1970 and 1979 for health care, nutrition
and population projects which increased to over three billion dollars between 1980 and
1990).
16. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT art. I (1989).
17. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 10 (1989). A similar provision is included for the Interna-
[VOL. 8:27
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The Articles of Agreement also state that:
[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other
non-economic influences or considerations. 8
Based upon the above provisions and the teleological, instead of the
literal reading accorded to them in practice, the following conclusion
may readily be reached. The World Bank's mandate should enable the
organization to assist member countries and to improve the economic
standards of their peoples. These efforts should be directed toward (1)
alleviating poverty; (2) providing universal education; (3) promoting
preventive and curative health care along with adequate nutrition; (4)
improving the economic and social status of women; (5) ensuring that
children and the elderly are cared for; (6) protecting the quality of life
for refugees, especially those involuntarily displaced as a result of de-
velopmental activities; (7) arresting the degradation of the environ-
ment; (8) conserving the environment for present and future genera-
tions; and (9) assuring the participation of people affected by
development projects in the design and implementation of those
projects. 19 These areas all have been viewed as falling within the World
Bank's purview.
However, a two-fold question still remains in any analysis of World
Bank authority. First, should the World Bank's already broad mandate
be further extended, by interpretation of the constituent agreement, to
give the World Bank and similar institutions a role in the advancement
of political rights? Some commentators argue that financial assistance
should be conditioned on the respect of political rights by recipient gov-
ernments. Furthermore, some authorities have found that the financial
resources of these institutions should be used to achieve a respect for
individual rights through financial incentives or sanctions.2 Second, if
tional Development Association. See INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION,
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. V, § 6 (1991).
18. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT art. III, § 5(b) (1989). Again, the Articles of Agreement of the IDA
contains a similar provision. See INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, ARTI-
CLES OF AGREEMENT art. V, § l(g) (1991) (containing similar language).
19. See SHIHATA, supra note I, at 133 (delineating the World Bank's mandate on
the appropriate methods for improving the economic standards of member nations); id.
at 110 (discussing poverty); id. at 116 (discussing education); id. at 117 (discussing
health care); id. at 33-34, 117-24 (discussing the role of women in economic develop-
ment); id. at 126-29 (discussing the environment); id. at 129-31 (discussing refugees).
20. See PAUL A. MOSELY, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-
BASED LENDING 21-25 (1991) (giving a brief history of the World Bank's changing
position on policy based lending). An examination of the World Bank's lending policies
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the preceding interpretation proves to be indefensible, the same com-
memtators argue that the charters of these institutions should be
amended to give these agencies an explicit role in the promotion and
protection of political rights. These areas mark the two key questions
which I will address today.
The first question stirred great controversy during the 1960s when
the United Nations General Assembly requested that the World Bank
refrain from lending funds to South Africa and Portugal because of
their poor political human rights records.2 The World Bank's policies
also created some debate during the 1970s when the United States
Congress enacted legislation, which remains in force, to require the
United States to use its voice and vote in the World Bank and a host of
similar agencies to "advance the cause of human rights, including by
seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than those whose
governments engage in ...a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. '22 When the United States
introduced this approach by 1977, therefore, the United States Board
member would oppose loans to countries which the United States con-
siders to have records of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. 3
In 1991, I had no difficulty in submitting a formal legal memoran-
dum to the World Bank's executive directors which stated that:
[v]iolation of political rights may ... reach such proportions as to become a
Bank concern, either due to significant direct economic effects or if it results in
international obligations relevant to the Bank, such as those mandated by bind-
ing decisions of the United Nations Security Council.2'
reveals that the World Bank has never made unconditional loans. Id. at 27. A broader
definition of "human needs," however, has expanded the World Bank's policy objec-
tives. See SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 133 (discussing the World Bank's efforts to end
poverty and improve human rights).
21. See 14 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAND, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1004-09
(1970) (providing a chronology of the events leading up to, and following, the World
Bank's refusal to lend funds to South Africa and Portugal).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 262d (a) (1988) (emphasis added). The disputed United States
legislation provides an exception to the requirement which opposes loans to countries
engaged in gross human rights violations in cases where "such assistance is directed
specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of the citizens of such
country." 22 U.S.C. § 262d (f) (1988).
23. Id.
24. Legal Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel of IBRD, Is-
sues of "Governance" in Borrowing Members - The Extent of Their Relevance Under
the Bank's Articles of Agreement (Feb. 5, 1991) (on file with author). See also
SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 79 (discussing the above mentioned memorandum). Clearly,
the Bank would not be in a position to extend lending at a normal scale to a country
where pervasive violations, or Security Council decisions, create conditions where it
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This view remains consistent with the more general view that "the
Bank should not allow political factors or events, no matter how ap-
pealing they may seem to be, to influence its decisions unless ... it is
established that they have direct and obvious economic effects relevant
to the World Bank. z2 5
After recognizing the possible entanglement of economic and politi-
cal considerations, I noted that the distinction in the Articles of Agree-
ment between these two considerations has been accorded great impor-
tance, both in the drafting history of the Articles and in World Bank
practice.26 Accordingly, I concluded that the prohibition against politi-
cal activity within the World Bank must be honored.27 However, this
prohibition should not mean that the World Bank cannot take account
of the political realities affecting its lending activities. 28 For example,
certain events may influence the stability and credit worthiness of
World Bank members, hinder the ability of its borrowers to service
loans and implement financed projects, or effect the World Bank's abil-
ity to monitor and supervise the implementation of such projects. 29
These economic effects are obviously relevant to the lender, even
though they may have political causes or origins.
The World Bank's overall concern with economic development
should also enable the organization to address good governance of its
member countries, and of borrowing countries whose economic develop-
ments are directly related to the Bank's work. 30 From this perspective,
governance implies the appropriate management of a country's re-
sources, based upon rules, implemented by institutions, to ensure ac-
countability. Proper governance also implies predictability, and legal
due process which, in turn, assumes a government of laws and not a
government of men."1
In my judgment, this conclusion has significant long-term implica-
tions. These World Bank activities serve the cause of human develop-
ment without entangling the World Bank in political issues that typi-
cally extend beyond its mandate as described in the Articles of
becomes unrealistic for such lending to receive support by the required majority in the
Bank's Board of Executive Directors.
25. SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 83.
26. SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 70-75.
27. SHIATA, supra note 1, at 95-96.
28. SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 84-93.
29. See SHiHATA, supra note 1, at 88-93 (explaining that the types of projects ef-
fected may include civil service reform, legal reform, accountability for public funds,
and budget discipline).
30. SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 53-96.
31. SHIHATA, supra note 1, at 85 n.96.
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Agreement. Of course, there are commentators who would like the
World Bank to take an even broader view in interpreting the Articles
of Agreement. Some revisionists would practically turn the interpreta-
tion process, which requires a simple majority in the Board of Execu-
tive Directors, into a more elaborate amendment process, in disregard
of the special majority required for amendments to the Articles of
Agreement.3 2
Although the real motivation behind the new liberal approach is eth-
ical in character, basically two legal arguments have been advanced in
its support. The first view is based on an extremely flexible approach to
interpretation, in which even explicit provisions in the constituent
agreement may be ignored for the sake of presumably overriding values
and policies. This approach is best articulated by one of the main char-
acters of Professor Tom Farer's drama on "Human Rights and Foreign
Policy.' ' 33 As his argument goes,
rules are only one element in the legal process. They express in summary form
expectations about the behavior which will ordinarily promote certain values and
policies. Those values and policies are themselves relevant legal materials. The
rules ...help guide us to the factors relevant to deciding in a particular case
what behavior should be applauded and what should be condemned.3 4
While I support a purposive, teleological interpretation of the provi-
sions of the charters of multilateral institutions, especially those which
take full account of the underlying objectives of the institutions and the
changing circumstances in which they operate, I cannot subscribe to
the view that such an interpretation may correctly reach the point of
contradicting the text - that is, of amending it - when the power of
amendment requires the approval of higher organs, and a much greater
majority, than does the power of interpretation. 5 One may be able to
argue that, in certain contexts, the word "colored" includes "whites"
because, after all, white is a color. To credibly argue, however, that
"white" really means black seems absurd. Including the economic fac-
tors and consequences that happen to have political origins or are asso-
ciated with political factors in a definition of the phrase "only economic
considerations" appears reasonable. 6 I do not find it credible, however,
32. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARTI-
CLES OF AGREEMENT art. 8(a) (1989) (requiring the approval of three-fifths of the
members).
33. Tom Farer, Human Rights and Foreign Policy: What the Kurds Learned (A
Drama in One Act), 14 HuM. RTs. Q. 62 (1992).
34. Id. at 70.
35. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment process).
36. SHIHATA, supra note I, at 75-79, 95.
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to conclude that "only economic considerations" would ordinarily mean
non-economic considerations.
The second argument in defense of the politicization of the World
Bank's work through the re-interpretation of its Articles of Agreement
seems to be based on the contention that human rights violations con-
stitute a violation of jus cogens rules of international law. 37 Therefore,
as the argument goes, the World Bank may properly ignore provisions
in its Articles of Agreement and be permitted to redress human rights
violations because of the higher order accorded to human rights law.38
Regardless of the controversy surrounding the contention that at least
some basic human rights constitute jus cogens, that contention means
only that international agreements should not derogate from peremp-
tory norms which mandate respect for basic human rights. It does not
imply that the World Bank or a similar institution should not lend to a
country where a violation of human rights occurs. A loan agreement to
a country which violates such rights does not in itself violate any
human rights rules, or for that matter, condone violation of such rights.
On the contrary, such assistance, if properly targeted, can alleviate the
suffering of the people by improving their standard of living.
Relevant to this discussion are the wise words of Professor Michael
Reisman of Yale Law School who stated that:
there is a limit to 'institutional elasticity', i.e., the extent to which institutions
created and still used for other purposes can be 'stretched' in order to get them
to perform human rights functions, especially when these functions are accom-
plished at the expense of their manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do
everything we think they are capable of, if this requires them to move too far
from their manifest mandate.31
If it is true, as I believe it is, that the World Bank's Articles of
Agreement cannot be appropriately interpreted to allow the World
Bank to use its lending power as an instrument for ensuring respect for
political human rights, except in circumstances where pervasive viola-
tions have obvious economics effects, or where compliance with U.N.
Security Council decisions requires that a specific course of action be
taken, amendment of the Articles of Agreement remains to be tackled.
Clearly, opinions widely differ on this matter of policy. I personally
37. See Antonio Gomez Robledo, Le lus Cognes International: Sa Genese. Sa Na-
ture, Ses Fonctions, 172 RECUEIL DEs CoUPs 17, 179 (1981) (stating that certain
principles of human rights are a fundamental part of jus cogens).
38. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, supra note 1, chapter 3 (elaborating the
question whether the World Bank must consider human rights violations in its lending
decisions).
39. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsi-
bilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IowA L. REv. 391, 395 (1987).
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believe in the value of specialization of international organizations.
Presently, there exist international fora which are not financial in na-
ture and which are mandated to ensure protection of political human
rights.40 Such organizations each have mechanisms for monitoring
compliance with human rights norms, such as the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, the regional commissions and courts of
human rights,41 and the various non-governmental organizations active
in this field.42
There is obviously a need to strengthen these institutions, as well as
their enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, in the context of the
new world order. Any future review of the United Nations Charter
should seriously address this concern. Bilateral donors also can condi-
tion their financial assistance on full respect for all human rights, in-
cluding political rights in the recipient countries.
The implication of this conclusion, however, does not mean that we
should require international financial institutions, with their specialized
mandate and competence, and with their reliance in many cases on
borrowing from financial markets, to be involved in such a politically
charged field. After all, double standards are easily found in this area.
Political manipulation of the institutions by members in pursuit of their
perceived national interests may be unavoidable once political consider-
ations are allowed to be freely taken into account.
Experience has proven the value of the insight of these institutions'
founders who insisted on their insulation from political considerations
which had no direct relevance to their mandate of promoting economic
development. Present practice also shows that depriving the unfortu-
nate people of countries under predatory and despotic regimes of finan-
cial assistance might only add further injury to the insult imposed by
their governments. In my view, the continuance of assistance to such
countries will be more humanitarian so long as such funds are used
only to improve the lot of the people. Improvement in the plight of
individuals may be accomplished by ensuring that economic and social
40. See generally JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE (1984) (describing the establishment of many of the
U.N. committees and sub-committees on human rights).
41. See generally Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1026-39 (1991) (illustrat-
ing the mandate and the structure of the regional human rights courts and commissions
in Europe, Latin America, and Africa).
42. David Weissbrodt, The Contribution of International Nongovernmental Orga-
nizations to the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (describing the mandate




adjustment programs will always be accompanied by social safety nets
and other measures to minimize their negative effect on the poor. Edu-
cation projects, which should receive priority in such circumstances
may also include an emphasis on human rights promotion. In this way,
the activities of such institutions will alleviate present suffering while
paving the way for future improvements, without falling into the risky
trap of politicizing financial institutions. As Sir Joseph Gold, the past
General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, has eloquently
asserted in defense of preserving the non-political character of that
institution:
[t]he swimmer who goes out too far may seem to be waving, but is drowning.
The fund that swims out too far, even in a moral cause, will risk drowning. It
will have lost the full confidence of its members. It will be less able to promote
universal prosperity. That task is the Fund's moral cause."3
Thank you.
43. SIR JOSEPH GOLD, I.M.F. SURV., POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PROHIB-
ITED BY ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT WHEN THE FUND CONSIDERS REQUESTS FOR THE
USE OF RESOURCES 146, 148 (1983).
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